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Abstract: The Japanese Imperial Army maintained chemical and biological testing facilities 
during the Asian Pacific War where unwilling civilians and prisoners of war were subjected to 
human experiments regarding frostbite, germ warfare, syphilis, weapons testing, and human 
anatomy. As American forces began occupying Japan and restructuring the country, the Allied 
Powers established an international tribunal to prosecute Japanese leaders deemed responsible 
for the war. During this time period, American policymakers would classify the Japanese bio 
warfare program, essentially protecting Japanese participants in the warfare program from facing 
trial. My research analyzes why American policymakers would classify Japan’s Biochemical 
Warfare Program and subsequently limit public awareness of Japanese wartime atrocities. I 
argue humanitarian influences were a minor influence in U.S. foreign policy. Through 
incentivizing Japanese participants in the BW program, the United States was able to gain and 
limit access to new information. The paper integrates past American research and the 2014 
archive of newly declassified government documents regarding U.S.-Japan relations during the 
1930s-1950s. Further research with Japanese, Chinese, and Russian primary documents will 
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Both the 2000 and 2000 winners of Pulitzer prizes awarded to nonfiction books on Japan, an 
indicator that the history of the Japanese Empire remains a great deal of interest in the 21st 
century. While a thriving and active field, it is also a field that has become fierce, indignant, and 
politically charged. The legacy of Japanese wartime atrocities has always been a steady weight 
on East Asian consciousness, but it has most recently garnered greater attention in Western 
scholarship. Interest in the United States became more prominent through the work of Asian 
immigrants and Asian-Americans. In 1997, Irish Chang captured Western audiences with her 
groundbreaking work on the brutality of the Imperial Japanese Army in The Rape of Nanking. In 
2017, San Francisco unveiled the “Comfort Women Memorial” in Chinatown, a sculpture of 
three Asian girls linking arms to remember the girls and women sexually enslaved the Japanese 
Imperial Army. Historical events dating back seventy-eighty years have begun to capture 
attention, and one of the unfortunate aspects of why this area has been largely downplayed in the 
United States is because the state had benefited from Japanese wartime atrocities. 
The Japanese Imperial Army maintained testing facilities in China during the Asian-Pacific War 
where unwilling civilians and prisoners of war were subjected to human experiments regarding 
frostbite, germ warfare, syphilis, weapons testing, and human anatomy.1 As American forces 
began occupying Japan and restructuring the country, the Allied Powers would establish an 
international tribunal to prosecute Japanese leaders deemed responsible for the war. During this 
time period, American policymakers would classify the Japanese biowarfare (BW) program, 
essentially protecting Japanese participants in the warfare program from facing trial. Through 
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incentivizing Japanese participants in the BW program, the United States was able to gain and 
limit access to new information.  
This paper will argue why American policymakers felt justified to prevent Japanese participants 
in Japan’s biological warfare program to face trial. The most important reason was because it 
was in American national interest and security to gain new knowledge on weapons. and 
technology. Ethical concerns regarding civilian causalities were not relevant from the 1930s-
1950s. Efficient technology to kill as many people as possible became an important goal during 
the Second World War. As the United States was also developing their own weapons program, 
the United States was strongly aware and interested in Japan’s biological warfare program. The 
Japanese BW program was known to be better than the United States since Japan used live 
human subjects.2 So there were discussions as to what weapons Japan developed, and how could 
the U.S. have defended themselves from such weapons. When the war ended and the United 
States occupied Japan, this came the opportunity for American actors to resolve these questions. 
Despite extensive control over Japan, the United States was unable to learn the full scope and 
content of the program. American policymakers felt through classifying the program, 
participants were more likely to share information. Postwar trials were a large role in 
incentivizing participants to disclose results and share information. The unconditional surrender 
policy ensured exclusive American control over the fate of BW experts. This is significant as 
American policymakers viewed it their right to dictate the outcome of trials, similar to other 
domestic trials conducted by other Allied Powers.  
Historical research regarding the program has been limited due to the classification, destruction, 
and fabrication of sources. Initial research was written to prove the existence of the Japanese BW 
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program. John W. Powell wrote the pioneering work in 1980 on the subject matter, 
demonstrating American and Japanese suppression of Japanese biological warfare against China 
and the Soviet Union.3 However, it was not until Sheldon Harris’s extensive study on research 
facilities was the field officially acknowledged in Western scholarship. He explains how allied 
intelligence and scientists were keen to learn about the nature and extent of Japanese BW 
activities, leading Colonel Murray Sanders and Arvo Thompson to conduct investigations, and 
also the American decision to offer scientists immunity in exchange for intelligence.4  
Civilian Lives and Technology 
For both the Ally and Axis Powers, foreign civilian lives were targets. Moral and ethical 
concerns were overridden in the war effort. Yuasa Kim, an army doctor for the Japanese Imperial 
Army remembered how he learned procedures for the first time:  
[The men] suddenly shot the Chinese, right in the stomachs, four or five times each. We then had to remove 
the bullets. That was our challenge. Could we remove them while they were still alive?5 
When he discusses the past, Yuasa states it was part of the wartime mentality, of a willingness to 
do anything because his country was at war.6 The American mentality was the same, “we never 
got the point saying this is awful, you know, let’s quit. We were directed to do these missions 
and we did,” and so these wartime rationalizations became more prominent than moral 
arguments.7 Those that suffered the most were more often than not civilians and noncombatants. 
On March 9, 1945, the B-29 bombers of the U.S. Air Force would use incendiary bombs to kill 
100,000 people and destroy fifteen square miles of urban Tokyo.8 And the Truman decision to 
drop the Atomic bomb was to save American lives, not foreign ones. Truman’s decision The 
brought worldwide prominence to nuclear weapons, and awareness of these weapons sheer 
power came with determined drive to possess such weapons and obtain military superiority. For 
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the United States, the government would also continue investing in their own nuclear program as 
well as exploring other areas of weapon development. Technology was crucial. The devastation 
of the First World War ended progressivism, the support for advocacy of social reform for 
countries.9 The new war turned to the skies, introducing the might of air power and terrible new 
weapons for the sole purpose of being able to kill as many people as possible in the shortest time 
feasible.10 Despite the horror of biological and chemical warfare, they programs were desirable 
to develop. Compared to experimenting with heavy artillery, formulating germ warfare such as 
gas was promising area of research since it was cheaper and efficient.11 
 
Despite arguments over whether a biological warfare program was worthwhile, on August 20, 
1941, it was determined the development of a biological warfare program was fundamental to 
U.S. interests.12 Major Leon A. Dox was the chief of the Medical Section in the U.S. Chemical 
Warfare Service previously argued that the decision was based on “their practicability rather than 
on the sentimental reactions of pacifists,” and so once the decision was made, by 1943 there were 
four BW research centers in the United States to explore offensive and defensive aspects of BW 
weapons.13  By this time, Japan’s Unit 731 was ten years ahead with research backed on human 
testing, so established was there program that Adolf Hitler sent medical officers to Japan to study 
bacteriological warfare research.14  
While the United States began to create their own BW program, American policymakers were 
also extremely conscious of the developing Japanese Biowarfare program. There are numerous 
reports detailing American awareness of such programs, from Japanese actors stealing yellow 
fever virus from New York research labs to the CIA reports of Japanese purposefully inducing 
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cholera among Chinese civilians.15At the forefront of American attention were Japanese 
biological and chemical attacks on the American home front.  
Japanese biowarfare became a pressing concern for the United States near the end of the war 
through the appearance of large Japanese balloons. Known as “Jellyfish in the Sky,” these 
balloons were 33 feet in diameter rigged with a 33-pound bomb.16 bombs floated and descend 
from the sky all across the U.S. mainland, confusing the mickey out of American civilians. 
Between 1944 and 1945, there were hundreds of these balloons found and catalogued in 
American military record.17 These balloons were shipped off for research, and while there was 
no evidence of these balloons becoming biological weapons, it brought concerns to various 
branches of the American government of the ruminating on all the possibilities that such attacks 
could occur. When the Pacific War came to an end, the American interest in the Japanese 
biological warfare program did not.  
The Truman administration knew it was necessary to study Japanese biowarfare centers to 
evaluate and utilize Japanese power. Truman believed co-opting Japanese powers was the next 
step in developing American power, and thus, it became necessary to study the biological 
warfare centers to evaluate the extent of Japanese power.18 Although the United States was the 
only country occupying Japan and possessing extensive control over the country, it was difficult 
to obtain information regarding the program. Part of this was because the Imperial Army would 
order military members to purposefully destroy wartime documents including those regarding 
the BW program.19 After the bombing of Hiroshima, Unit 731 seemed to “vanish of the face of 
the earth,” as the Imperial Army had destroyed facilities, killed witnesses, and sworn staff to 
silence.20 It became difficult for Americans to learn the extent and parameters of their research. 
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Compton, the President of the MIT recall when discussing research with other Japanese 
scientists, Compton reports they were “cooperative,” but would deny any preparation for 
offensive bacteriological warfare, stating “we aren’t supposed to talk about that.21 More subtle 
investigation revealed that primary data at facilities were destroyed, directly contradicting 
statements of Japanese scientific community.22 
There are many possibilities as to why participants did not want to discuss their experiences. 
There was loyalty to each other, to their “vows of silence,” but also fearful of retribution. To 
discuss terrible things done was to open oneself for attacks. Additionally, one had to confront 
what they had done. The Tokyo Trials were pivotal part in encouraging naming those involved in 
the program. The International Military Tribunal for the Far East was largely a product of the 
Allies’ victory to punish Japanese leaders for war crimes. New classes of crime, such as Class C 
Crimes, Crimes Against Humanity were defined as “inhuman acts committed against any civilian 
population,” and outlined clearly in the Japanese newspapers.23 By then, a flood of informants 
began writing to the Tokyo headquarters. Thousands of Japanese participants were named, and it 
threatened to overwhelm investigators how to validate the legitimacy of these accusations.  
The American investigation determined the legitimacy of correspondaence by evaluating the 
specificity of information such as names, locations, and activities.24 Some were deemed as 
“fantasy” while others like Takeshi Nishimura’s report were taken seriously. His report listing 
members of those who dissected war prisoners in Hainking, China were researched.25 The 
turning point came when Americans identified the leader of the Japanese BW program. Hiroshi 
Ueki naming Ishii Shiro as the commander of the military unit experimenting on people.26 He 
states:  
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[He] executed brutal experiments on many Allied PsW. At the time of the end of the war, it was no secret 
to the people that he destroyed the experiment station and the evidences. The placing of his name on war 
crimes suspect list was inevitable, but lately, he is using bribes to escape the consequences.27  
It is difficult to discuss what was Hiroshi Ueki’s role was during the war. The legal/investigative 
of SCAP division opened an investigation on Ueki and reports indicate investigators were unable 
to locate him.28 Regardless, this became a turning point for the entire case. On Nov 1948, the 
SCAP Intelligence Division would classify the entire case and prevent the SCAP legal section, 
the section spearheading the Military Tribunal from investigating the Japanese bio warfare unit 
and effectively conceal from Allied countries.29 Ishii Shiro’s file was classified as “secret”.30 
When Ishii Shiro and other BW experts were not prosecuted during the Tokyo Trials, it is clear 
that American actors ensured that he did not face trial. It is deeply ironic that these informants 
were singled out to face trial, not be granted immunity. However, based on the documents and 
reports, it is clear investigators had several problems understanding the details of Japan’s BW 
program. Physical evidence was destroyed. People were unwilling to talk about the program. For 
investigators the only viable solution at the time to gain information was to incentivize 
participants to share and discuss their experience. As such, the path to immunity was paved.  
Conclusions 
There has been significant research done on the Second World War. Numerous books, movies, 
documentaries, and social platforms contribute to public memory and understanding. Yet, despite 
all this information, there are still controversial opinions as to what happened in the war. As a 
developing body of work, Japanese wartime atrocities have increasingly become prevalent for 
the public and international politics. These historical problems are not limited to East Asia as 
they have become a part of American legacy. The Unit 731 Museum in Harbin, China blatantly 
accuses that Japanese participants “all escaped trial for war crimes” because of Americans. There 
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are many issues with this statement such as China’s own persecution of Japanese during the 
domestic postwar trials, and so forth, but the provoking statement emphasizes the need to 
analyze why the American policymakers made such a decision.  
Firstly, seeking justice for Chinese civilian was not a priority for the United States. The Second 
World War was distinctively cruel toward civilians. Moral and ethical concerns over the 
treatment of foreign civilians were overridden for the war effort. This was a universal truth for 
both Allied and Axis countries. The United States was particularly cruel during the war toward 
civilians. As a result, Chinese civilian suffering was not a concern or factor in U.S. decision 
making. At the time, countries including the United States would place national interests above 
humanitarian concerns.  
Developing weapons became a national interest for the United States. The First and Second 
World War emphasize the necessity of effective weapons, most notably weapons capable of 
killing large groups of people at a time. The country began developing nuclear and biological 
weapons. Ideas at the time were based on “practicability,” and not pacifism. However, the 
discrepancy between the United States BW program and Japanese BW program became 
apparent. As Japanese Ballons became a problem on the U.S. Homefront, it became increasingly 
important for the United States to understand their counterpart’s program. Truman believed 
Japanese power needed to be co-opt for American use during the Cold War. As a result, actors 
investigated Japan’s BW program after the war. Contrary to expectation, American 
investigations on Japan’s BW program were rife with problems. It became apparent that the best 
method to learn about the program was through incentivizing participants to share their 
knowledge willingly. This decision has garnered resentment among Chinese citizens. However, 
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there were hundreds of domestic postwar trials where bio warfare experts were persecuted. 
American policymakers viewed it their right to dictate the outcome of trials, similar to other 
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